GROUNDS FOR THE MODIFICATION OF
ALIMONY AWARDS
EUGENE DESVERNINE*

A fertile field of litigation in the realm of domestic relations arises in connection
with the modification of divorce decrees relating to alimony. The frequency with
which divorced parties seek judicial amendment of the orders awarding alimony
indicates the social significance of the matter and warrants an investigation of the
bases upon which the courts operate in determining such controversies.' With this
objective in view a study has been made of all the cases involving modification of
alimony decrees which reached the appellate courts during the period comprehended
between the years 1926 to 1938 inclusive.2 Proper treatment of all the issues which
arise in such cases would necessitate an inquiry into a diversity of legal problems,

such as the existence and extent of the judicial power of revision, which lie beyond
the scope of this paper 3 Attention, therefore, will be focused exclusively on the substantive considerations which determine whether or not a given award will be
changed as revealed by the cases examined.

At the outset much confusion will be avoided by an exposition of the distinction
between the modification of a decree awarding alimony by an appellate court to which
the case has been brought on appeal from the decision in the original divorce court,
* A.B., Duke University, 1937; third year student at Duke Univesity School of Law. Member of the
editorial board of the Duke Bar Assodation Journal.
1 142 cases involving revision of alimony orders are cited by the Third Decennial Digest, 1916-1926;
for the following decade the Fourth Decennial cites 253 such cases. In view of the fact that these citations
represent mainly appellate decisions, the number appears to be substantial.
5
The cases cited by the Fourth Decennial Digest, 1926-1936, and the yearly Digests for 1936, 1937, and
1938 have been analyzed. Although the selection of this period has been in a large measure arbitrary, due
regard was had for the importance of contemporary decisions in a field where the law is undergoing rapid
evolution.
'Perhaps the most consequential of these problems relates to the power to modify or cancel past-due
installments of alimony. The majority of states deny the power as to such installments, but a minority
permit modification. See 2 SCHOULER, MARRoAGE, DivoRcE, SEPRAoN, AND DOMEmC RLAOno~s (6th ed.
1921) §1830; cf. Jacobs, The Enforcement of Foreign Decrees for Alimony, infra. p. 261, notes 70, 71.
Much litigation has arisen as to the extent of the court's power to modify decrees entered by consent.
Where the court has approved an agreement between the parties relating to alimony, this is generally regarded as a contract which cannot be modified except by the parties themselves. 17 AmI. JuR. (1938) §649.
Contra: Low v. Low, 79 Colo. 408, 246 Pac. 266 (1926); Herrick v. Herrick, 3x9 Ill. 146, x49 N. E. 82o
(1926). However, the decree may be altered to the extent that it is not dependent on the parties' agreement. 17 Am. JuR. §649. As to what constitutes a reservation of a power to modify a decree based on
agreement, compare Crawford v. Crawford, 129 Misc. 683, 221 N. Y. Supp. 551 (1927), and Folz v. Folz,
42 Ohio App. 135, 181 N. E. 658. On the power to modify decrees based on agreements, see (1933) 19
VA. L. Rae. 513; (937) 22 WVAs. UNiv. L. Q. 263, 392; (1938) 26 CAL. L. REv. 491, 707.
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and modification of a decree upon independent petition by one of the parties. Aside
from procedural differences, the distinction is important in that the rules which determine a court's disposition of a case in each situation arc widely dissimilar. In the

former the court is concerned with the propriety of the lower court's decision on the
facts and evidence introduced before it, whereas in the latter the decision of the
original divorce tribunal is not open to attack and the court is exclusively concerned
with the situation of the parties as it exists at the time of the petition. There is no
time limitation operating against a party who seeks revision of an alimony decree by
the second method, and no restriction on the number of times a petition may be
brought. Courts are wary of attempts by parties to a divorce proceeding to appeal
from the part of the decree with which they are dissatisfied without complying with
the statutes and rules governing appeals, and will not entertain a petition unless
4
properly supported by a showing of the required conditions.
The rule which permits a change in the terms of the alimony decree to conform
to new circumstances is derived from the ecclesiastical courts, which restricted it to
cases of limited divorce.5 Where an absolute divorce has been granted it is generally
held in this country that the power to alter a decree after it has been made does not
exist in the absence of the reservation of such power in the decree itself, or of
statutory authority. 6 Such statutes may be found in the majority of the American
jurisdictions,7 and the matter is usually left within the discretion of the court to
make such revision "as circumstances may require," "as may be proper," 9 "as the
case may require,"' 0 etc. Unless extraordinary circumstances justify such a course,
the modification will not be made by the court on its own motion, but will be considered only upon application by one of the parties." Courts make the granting of
relief dependent upon the showing of "changed circumstances,"' 2 "changed conditions," 13 "a change in the situation of the parties,"' 14 or a showing that the original
decree is "no longer fair and just."' Therefore, a petition which fails to allege that
the conditions upon which the relief is predicated did not exist at the time of the
rendition of the final divorce decree is fatally defective.' 8 Occasionally, however, it is
'Glad

v. Glad, 51 S. D. 574, 215 N. W. 931 (1937).
'See Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334 (1898).
02 SCHOULEit, op. cit. supra note 3, §1828. Statutes granting the courts power to modify alimony
decrees are held not to apply where no alimony has been granted in the original decree. Id. §,807. A
decree awarding alimony in gross may not be modified after full performance. Id. §1830.
' For a compilation of the statutory authority on this subject, see 2 VERumER, AaesucAN FAmALy LAws
(1932) §1o6, Table LIV and 1938 Supplement.
'N. J. REv. STrAT. (I937) §2:50-37.
'Mo.Rxv. STAT. (1929) H1355, 1361.

"MIss. CODE (1930)

§1421.

" InMcPardand v.McPartland, 146 Misc. 672, 261 N. Y. Supp. 844 (1933), where the husband was
imprisoned for contempt for failure to pay alimony, the court modified the order on itsown motion to
exempt him from making the payments during his imprisonment. Likewise, inAndrews v.Andrews, 144
Ore. 200, 24 P. (2d) 332 (1933), the court reduced the alimony when itfound the husband had become
a paralytic cripple, upon citation
for contempt for failure to make the payments.
'2 Smith v.Smith, 334 Ill.
370, 166 N. E. 85 (1929).
15 Badger v.Badger, 69 Utah 293, 254 Pac. 784 (X927).
"Holida v. Holida, 183 Minn. 618, 237 N. NV. 2 (193).
"Low v.Low,79 Colo. 408, 246 Pac. 266 (1926).
" Ex parte Allen, 221 Ala. 393, 128 So. 8ox (1930).
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difficult to avoid a suspicion that courts have been moved to modify decrees on the
basis of their reaction to the propriety or impropriety of the original award, and not,
as claimed, on the theory that subsequent conditions have rendered its enforcement
unfair. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a court rebelling at the requirement of
"changed circumstances."
In Cohen v. Cohen,17 the husband' 8 applied for a reduction in his alimony payments from. $25 to $i5 a week on the ground he was unable to pay over that sum.
Although he neither alleged nor proved that the conditions of the parties had changed
since the time of the decree, he was granted the reduction. The applicable statute
authorized the revision of the decree "from time to time as circumstances may require," and it was held in an opinion by the lower court that an application for
modification should be decided "in accordance with the very right of the matter at
the time it is before the court for disposition, ... in accordance with equity and good
conscience." The requirement that changed circumstances be shown, said the court,
necessitated an examination of the factors on which the original order was based.
This is rendered difficult by the fact that in most cases the testimony of the parties
in the divorce action is not readily obtainable; often it has been made in the course
of a final hearing and it has not been preserved. "More than once," said the judge, "I
have been detained while I sought, without success, to ascertain the basis of an order
for payment made some years before." The court, however, recognized the danger
of a universal application of the policy it pretended to adopt by warning that only
"meritorious applications" would be considered and that "petitions without merit
will not only be discouraged but will trouble the applicant."
The notion that a decree which is inequitable at the time it is sought to be modified cannot be changed simply because it was also inequitable at the time it was
granted may be offensive to one's sense of justice, and the practical difficulties encountered in obtaining the evidence adduced before the court in the divorce action
should not be underestimated. But the rule adopted in Cohen v. Cohen is no less
subject to practical objections. What criterion should the applicant employ to determine in advance whether his application is meritorious or otherwise, and what
effective check would there be against attempts by parties to attack a decree collaterally, when they are precluded from doing so directly? Such a procedure would
amount in many cases to a retrial of the same issues in clear violation of the established doctrine of res judicata.
Since the establishment of changed conditions is generally a condition precedent
to relief, it becomes pertinent to inquire what new circumstances will warrant a
modification of the alimony order. The decision of the lower court with respect to
this issue will not be overruled on appeal unless its action constitutes a clear abuse of
discretion. The difficulties encountered in estimating what amounts to such an
abuse are the same as those presented by the appellate reports where the original
15 N. J. Misc. 666, 194 Ad. 257 (937).
1 in the interests of convenience, the terms "husband" anc "wife" will be used, although technically

17
1

inaccurate because of the dissolution of the marriage.
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award is under review. Since the problem of control of the lower court's discretion
is treated at some length in the course of a study of original awards included in this
symposium, 19 no special consideration will be devoted to that aspect of the problem
in this article.
The ability of the husband to make the payments and the needs of the wife may
be said to constitute the basic alimony equation. In principle, therefore, a change in
either of these two factors should bring about a change in the result, and this is
apparently the theory upon which the decree is altered. In practice, however, the
seeming simplicity of the equation is disturbed by the fact that the two basic considerations mentioned are not the only determinants of the award and that for
obvious reasons it is inexpedient to amend the order when the change is insig20
nificant.
Attention will first be given to the circumstances which effect variations in the
husband's ability to pay the sum decreed. That "one cannot get blood out of a
turnip" is a truism particularly applicable to an improvident husband, and a reduction in the source from which the payments are made should lead to a reduction in
the payment. A decline in the husband's monthly salary from $400 to $175 has been
held to warrant a decrease in the alimony payable by him from $i5o to $87.50 per
month, 1 while demotion of an engineer to the position of fireman with the consequent reduction in earnings from $250 to $150 monthly has induced a reduction in
his payments from $45 to $35 a month.22 On the other hand, a fall in the husband's
yearly earnings from $58,ooo to $i6,ooo was held in another case2 3 to support a modification of the decree from $i2,ooo to $7,5o0 per annum. A substantial drop in the
price of a commodity which constitutes the husband's sole source of income, 24 or a
showing that his interest as remainderman under a trust has materially depreciated
in value, 2-5 or that a substantial part of his estate has become worthless since the
award of the decree, 26 have all been held to justify a decrease in the payments.
The acuteness of the financial depression in the early years of this decade and its
burden on the professions was judicially noticed by the court in Williams v.Willams, 7 wherein the payments of a divorced lawyer who had undergone bankruptcy
proceedings were reduced from $5oo to $325 a month on his showing that his present
income was $io,90o a year. In contrast is the attitude shown by the court in David v.
" Coocy, The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony, supra, at pp. 221-224.
0In Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, X49 N. E. 820 (1926), it was stated that in making a change in
the alimony award, the court should take into consideration the property and income of the parties, their
ages, health, and social conditions, and whether there are any children dependent upon one or both of
them for support. For all the factors which are considered by the courts in making the award, see Cooey,
The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony Cases, supra, at pp. 217-221.
"' Miller v. Miller, 114 W. Va. 6oo, i72 S. E. 893 (1934), reversing the decision of the lower court.
2"Boquette v. Boquette, 215 Iowa 990, 247 N. W. 255 (1933), affirming decision of the lower court.
"Luedke v. Luedke, 215 Wis. 303, 254 N. W. 525 (I934).
24 Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P. (2d) 277 (1937).
* Kennard v. Kennard, 87 N. H. 320, 179 Adt. 414 (1935).
'XWatson v. Watson, 113 W. Va. 267, 168 S. E. 373 (I933).
27 12 N. J. Misc. 641, 174 Ad. 423 (1934), in opinion by the lower court.
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David,28 where no sympathy was accorded to the pleas of the divorced husband for
reduction of the award on the ground' that the prevailing depression had greatly
lessened his ability to make the required payments. Holding that the petitioner, in
times of good fortune, should "have provided for all possible exigencies, including
the one from which he now seeks to escape," the court observed that "no patience or
sympathy is had for those who seek to take advantage of present conditions in order
to foil an obvious and indisputable duty."
Allegations of ill health and physical incapacity on the part of the husband are
usually accompanied by a showing of decreased income which will justify a reduction. Thus, where the petitioner had sustained injuries in an automobile accident
which were found to have reduced his earning capacity as a physician, his present
income being insufficient for his own support, the court cut the award from $2oo to
$ioo a month.2 9 The husband has likewise been entitled to a modification of the
order when he showed his health had been impaired and that he did not have sufficient funds to obtain necessary hospital treatment.3 0 But proof of ill health subsequent to the decree will not support a revision at the instance of the husband where
it appears his earnings have increased.3 1
Unfortunately, the reported decisions in many cases furnish inadequate, if any,
information concerning the financial status of the parties and therefore fail to throw
any light on the issue of what constitutes a "substantial decrease" in income which
will entitle the party to a downward revision of the decree. Apparently a showing
by the husband that financial reverses have lessened or terminated his ability to meet
the terms of the payments seldom fails to bring relief from the courts. A reduction
from $35 to $3o a month in the man's compensation and indebtedness in the sum of
$213 have been held not to be a sufficient change of condition to warrant modification,32 but usually a refusal to revise the order on the basis of decreased income is
induced by a finding that the applicant's allegations concerning his financial difficulties are inaccurate or untrue., Courts have denied the husband's application for
reduction when they have found that his financial position was even better than at
the time of the original decree.33 In another case the petitioner's claim that his
property and income had fallen in value, rendering it difficult for him to meet the
$3o weakly payments, failed to impress the court, which found that his annual income was $5,ooo (it is not stated what it was formerly) and that his second wife was
gainfully employed. 4 A much stronger case was presented by a petitioning husband who sought a reduction in his $285 monthly alimony payments, but the court
refused to grant him any relief although his income had' admittedly fallen from
Misc. 444, 26x N. Y. Supp. 456 (1933), in opinion by the lower court,
" Junger v. Junger, 215 Iowa 636, 246 N. W. 659 (933), affirming the lower court's decision.

28 146

" Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 P. (2d) 894 (935),
" Kirk v. Kirk, 222 Iowa 945, 270 N. W. 432 (i937).

reversing the lower court's decision.

"Carson v. Carson, supra note 29.
*' Sauve v. Sauve, 243 Mich. 33, 219 N. IV. 662 (x928); Texter v. Texter, 252 Mich. 53, 232 N. W.
140 (i928); Molema v. Molema, 103 Cal. App. 79, 283 Pac. 956 (1930).
" Schweim v. Schweim, 233 Mich. 67, 206 N. W. 353 (1926), affirming decision of the lower court.
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$i6,ooo to $7,0oo a year. The fact that he had failed to reduce his living expenses
and lived in apparent luxury was doubtless the determining factor in the decision.
A party may not escape the obligations of an alimony decree by spending more

than his income,36 nor, apparently, may he do so by deliberately refusing to work or
to take advantage of his earning capacity?

7

It follows that earning capacity, even

in the absence of actual employment, is an element to be considered in determining
the measure of alimony the husband shall be required to pay 38 In one case the wife
sought an increase in the payments on the ground of her ill health. The husband
claimed he earned only $28oo a year, but the court concluded from the findings that
he was capable of earning at least $6,ooo a year, which added to $3ooo he received

from his great-grandfather's estate, made an annual income of $9,ooo, and the award
was increased from $72o to $4,0oo a year for the support of the wife and a i5-year-old
30
daughter.
An increase in the income or property of the husband may be made the basis for
an upward revision of the alimony decree in favor of the wife. Since the period considered in this report was in the main one of falling prices and reduced incomes,
such petitions by the wife were infrequent.40 It is probable, moreover, that in the
long run applications for modifications by the party on whom the burden rests to
make the payments will outnumber petitions by the recipient for additional awards,
inasmuch as the pressure on the former to seek judicial relief is undeniably greater.
Still, the courts will not refuse to entertain applications for increased alimony where
they are well founded. For instance, upon proof by the wife that her divorced husband had come into money as beneficiary of a trust estate subsequent to the decree,
entitling him to about $5,o0o a year, the decree was revised to call for additional payments of $i5o a month. That the trustees had not actually paid the amount due and
that the trust was a "spendthrift trust," exempting the beneficiary's income from the
claims of creditors, did not deter the court from its decision. 41 An increase in the
husband's salary from $2,ooo to $io,ooo a year and a rise in the cost of living have
been held to warrant an increase in the monthly payments to the wife from $6o to

$i5o "to correspond with the social position of her former husband and maintain her
in the style and condition that his financial position would reasonably have justified
her in maintaining but for his wrongful conduct [which led to the divorce]."142 In
Faye v. Faye43 the court upheld a $900 increase in the annual payments for the support of the wife and child, notwithstanding the husband's financial means had not
improved, on the ground that the original allowance had failed to provide for med" Heard v. Heard, 116 Conn. 632, 166 Ad. 67 (1933), affirming decision of the lower court.
" Moore v. Moore, 163 Miss. 15, 140 So. 526 (1932), affirming the lower court's decision.
17 Robins v. Robins, Io6 N. J. Eq. x98, xSo Ad. 340 (1930).
"3Faye v. Faye, 131 Misc. 388, 226 N. Y. Supp. 729 (1928).
"Farlee v. Farlee, ior N. J. Eq. ii, 137 Ad. 648 (927).

" Only four petitions by the wife for modification of the award on the ground of the husband's increased income are cited by the Fourth Decennial Digest, 1926-1936.
"'Erickson v. Erickson, 18i Minn. 421, 232 N. W. 793 (1930), affirming decision of the lower court.
"' Humbird v. Humbird, 42 Idaho 29, 243 Pac. 827 (1926), modifying decision of the lower court.
'

131 Misc. 388, 226 N. Y. Supp. 729 (1928).
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ical and dental expenses, the child's vacation needs, and repairs to furniture, and that
the husband's earning capacity should be considered.
However, much fluctuations in the income of the husband may be grounds for the
amendment of the decree, the courts are apparently committed to the rule that his
remarriage and its attendant financial burden may not be successfully urged in support of a petition for modification. 44 Voluntary assumption of new family obligations
which diminish the husband's ability to comply with the terms of the decree should
not, it is thought, avail him in avoiding the duty to support his former wife which is
embodied in the alimony order. Furthermore, the father's subsequent marital engagements should not be allowed to jeopardize the maintenance of the children of
his first marriage and insofar as there is a conflict between the husband's duties to
his first family and to his new family the inclination seems to be to resolve it in favor
of the former. The policy is doubtless intended to discourage future marital alliances
on the part of those whose financial means are inadequate for the support of both
families. In Neuhangen v. Neuhangen45 the court, while refusing to modify the
decree at the instance of the husband who alleged his remarriage, attempted to
impress him with the gravity of marital obligations and remarked: ".... he has yet
to learn, it would seem, that getting married is serious, and marrying a second time
while the bride he first led to the altar, and those born of that marriage, must be
supported, is still more serious."
Where there are no children, however, a different attitude may prevail. This is
illustrated by the decision in Lamborn v. Lamborn4" wherein the husband applied
for a reduction in the payments on the ground he wished to remarry and that his
divorced wife could earn money for her support. In upholding a decrease in the
alimony from $45 to $3o a month, the court held it was proper to consider the laudable wish of the husband, who had no children, to remarry and that he should not be
so crippled' in his finances as to preclude the establishment of another home.
Although his remarriage is seldom alleged by the husband as the sole basis for
invoking modification of the decree it is very often to be found among the grounds
upon which the petition is founded, usually in conjunction with claims of reduced
income. This indicates a notion that in spite of rules to the contrary such a circumstance will reflect favorably upon the petitioner's case. Such a notion may often be
well founded, for it is arguable that the demands of a man's new family should be
preferred to those of a family with whom he has severed all social connections. A
failure to give adequate consideration to the husband's new obligations may lead to
marital discord and to the break-up of a happily constituted marriage to enable the
husband to bear the burden of a former marriage which has already been dissolved.
But courts usually are adamant against granting relief where the factors alleged in
"' Stone v. Stone, 212 Iowa 1344, 235 N. W. 492 (1931); Williams v. Williams, i 9 Neb. 8, 226 N. W.
798 (1929); Aiken v. Aiken, 221 Ala. 67, 127 So. 81 9 (1930); Simpson v. Simpson, 5x Idaho 99, 4 P.
(2d) 345 (1933).
d 92 Colo. x55, x8 P. (2d) 454 0934).
8o Cal. App. 494, 251 Pac. 943 (1927).
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support of the petition, exclusive of the remarriage, are insufficient to warrant mod47
ification.
Where there are children of the second marriage the tendency would seem to be
toward greater leniency, although even here some courts are unmoved. In one case it
was held that remarriage of the husband and his obligation to support four stepchildren was not a "change of conditions," although it appeared that a son by the
first marriage had already reached his majority and could support his mother.4 8 In
another, a showing by the petitioning husband that he had remarried and had three
new children, that he was afflicted with a heart disease, and that he was to be pensioned off shortly with a material reduction in income did not avail him in obtaining
relief. 49 A more realistic approach is taken by some courts, such as that in Shattuck v.
Shattuck,"0 where a reduction in the alimony payments from $50 to $20 a month was
upheld under similar circumstances and it was said to be "the duty of the court to
make a fair division of respondents income between the two families.... He has as
much duty to, and the court has as much interest in, those children [of the second
marriage] as those of the first marriage." Another court held that the new family
obligations of a husband who had remarried and had a child were to be considered,
in addition to a decrease in his salary, in reducing his monthly alimony payments.5 1
Similarly, a court has refused to increase the award upon petition by the wife,
although his income had risen, for his financial burdens had mounted on his remarriage and birth of another child, and "his obligations to these had to be met."5 2
Lord v. Lord53 intimates that a showing by the husband that the burden of the
decree precludes him from furnishing adequate support to his new wife will warrant
modification of the decree. In that case a petition alleging remarriage and support
of a stepson was held insufficient to entitle the husband to a reduction since it was
unaccompanied by a showing of inability to support his present wife suitably.
Attention is now turned from the first variable, the husband's ability to pay, to a
consideration of the second major component of the basic alimony equation, the
needs of the wife. A substantial change in the requirements of the divorced wife for
her support should furnish the basis for a modification of the alimony order. The
ability of the wife to earn her own living is a factor which enters into the computation of the original award. Acquisition of earning capacity and actual employment
after the decree have been held not to support a decrease in the payments upon
application by the husband."4 On the other hand, in Lamborn v. Lamborn5 5 it ap""Williams v. Williams, Aiken v. Aiken, both supra note 43. But remarriage of the husband will not
preclude him from obtaining a reduction if other facts render modification expedient. Nicolls v. Nicolls,
211 Iowa 1193, 235 N. 'V. 288 (1931).
"'Cook v. Cook, 168 Wash. 649, 13 P. (2d) 38 (1932), affirming decision of the lower court.
" Morrison v. Morrison, 2o8 Iowa 1384, 227 N. W. 330 (1929), affirming decision of the lower court.
0141 Wash. 6oo, 251 Pac. 851 (1927).

"tEddy v. Eddy, 264 Mich. 328, 249 N. W. 868 (1933), affirming lower court's decision.
" Frank v. Frank, 287 S. W. 829 (Mo. App. 1926), reversing lower court's decision.
ta 37 N. M. 24, 16 P. (2d) 933 (1933), reversing lower court's decision.
"Newburn v. Newburn, 210 Iowa 639, 231 N. XV. 389 (931), reversing lower court's decision.
"Supra note 45.
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peared that the wife, though incapacitated by reason of illness to carry on her professional work as nurse, was able to engage in other types of work and earn a part
of her living. Nevertheless, she showed a complete lack of disposition to contribute
anything to her own support and the court dwelt at length upon this factor in reducing the monthly sum payable by the husband from $45 to $35. In view of the size of
the original amount it is interesting to observe in the opinion the statement that a
divorce court in awarding alimony where the husband earns his living by daily labor,
"should not do so in a sum inducing idleness on the part of the wife." Similarly, it
has been held that proof that the wife was now earning a monthly salary of $146 is
sufficient to justify termination of the alimony payments of $250 a month.50 The
opinion fails to disclose what, if any, were the wife's earnings at the time of the
decree. For a husband to obtain a modification of the decree without showing a
change of condition on his part, he must establish that the wife is now self7
supporting.Y
Physical injuries arising subsequent to the decree which make it impossible for
the wife to contribute to her support were considered proper grounds for an alimony
increase from $i 5 to $75 monthly in Curtiss v. Fisher."' Ill health and medical treatment necessitating extraordinary expenses may also be asserted by the wife in obtaining a revision of the decree, 59 or in successfully preventing a reduction in the payments at the husband's request. 0° Where, in spite of il health or financial reverses
on the part of the wife there has been a corresponding decline in the husband's income it would seem that the "changes" would nullify each other and neither party
should be able to obtain a revision. 6 1 A wife may not, by voluntarily changing her
residence to a location where her cost of living is higher, become entitled to additional
62
alimony.
The remarriage of the divorced wife is generally assumed to relieve the alimonypaying husband of the duty of supporting her, inasmuch as assumption of this obligation by the second husband will usually wipe out the need for further payments.
The statutes of several jurisdictions make it mandatory upon the court to modify the
decree upon the remarriage of the wife, provided, of course, application is made
therefor."8 But in the absence of such statutory provision the courts are not unanimous in the view that this circumstance in itself is a proper basis for termination of
the payments. Within recent years two New Jersey courts have differed in their
"'Ross v. Ross, I Cal. (2d) 368, 35 P. (2d) 316 (1934), modifying decision of the lower court.
" Foltz v. Folz, 281 Mich. 579, 274 N. W. 755 (1937).
rs x86 La. x26, x71 So. 716 (927), reversing lower court's decision.
"' Rood v. Rood, 280 Mich. 33, 273 N. W. 337 (1937), affirming lower court's decision. In Kelley v.
Kelley, 290 S. W. 624 (Mo. App. 1927), the wife's allegations that she could not work steadily at her employment because of physical inability were regarded with much scepticism by the court, who refused to
increase the alimony and remarked that "the plaintiff has exhibited exceptional ability to take care of
herself in adverse circumstances."
" Molema v. Molema, supra note 32.
No case, however, was found involving this situation.
', Brassert v. Brassert, 269 Mich. 545, 257 N. V. 879 (1935), affirming lower court's decision.
05

See 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN
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64
interpretation of the effect of the wife's remarriage. In Dietrick v. Dietrick the
court relieved the husband from the duty of making further payments under the
decree upon his showing of the remarriage of the wife. It was there held that this
event raises a presumption that the necessity for alimony no longer exists, subject to
rebuttal on the part of the wife by proof that the second husband is unable to support
her in the manner and station of the first husband, which the wife failed to do in
that case. On the other hand, in Cropsey v. Cropsey0 5 the court refused to modify
the decree upon the wife's remarriage and, in contrast to the "presumption" theory
above, held the husband had failed to sustain the burden of proving that the wife

was not in need of further payment. In another case proof that the wife had married

a man of "considerable means" was considered sufficient to discontinue the alimony
award."' A man may not, however, without the court's sanction, cease the payments
when his divorced wife contracts a new marriage, and he will be liable for the unpaid

alimony which accrued until the time application is made for termination."
An anomalous situation is presented where the divorced parties have intermarried
again. A few jurisdictions provide in their statutes that upon application by both

parties and satisfactory proof of their intermarriage, the court "may" annul the orders
relating to the payment of alimony.63 The inference may be drawn therefrom that
intermarriage does not ipso facto abrogate the duty of the husband to satisfy the
terms of the decree. In Carson v. Carson,69 however, it was held that remarriage of
the parties to each other annuls the decree and neither party may seek to enforce or

modify its terms. Though clearly obiter, the court intimates that where the second
marriage has been judicially dissolved the provisions of the original alimony decree
might be enforced.
The husband cannot escape the duty of supporting his children because his wife
has remarried.7 0 The divorce decree may make separate allowance for the support of

the children, or the provisions for their maintenance may be embodied in the general
alimony award granted to the wife. Whichever method is used, the payments for

their benefit may be changed for reasons substantially identical to those which obtain in the case of payments for the benefit of the wife. They may be increased where

they have become inadequate or the wife has become helpless and unable to contribute to their support, or they may be decreased where the husband's income has
fallen, or illness has caused him large expense, or the wife has inherited property on
her own account.7 1 The husband may likewise be freed from the duty of paying for
99 N. J. Eq. 711, 134 Atl. 338 (1926).
as 104 N. J. Eq. 187, 144 Ad. 621, 64 A. L. R. 1266 (1929).
"Shoop v. Shoop, 58 S. D. 593, 237 N. W. 904 (1931).
17 Niedt v. Niedt, 95 S. W. (2d) 868 (Mo. 1936). Conceivably, much of the difficulty concerning revision upon the wife's remarriage may be circumvented by provision in the decree for continuation of the
payments while the wife remains single. North v. North, 1oo S. W. (2d) 582 (Mo. 1937).
o8 2 VERMaR, AmumicN FA mLy LAws, §io6.
00 143 Old. 274, 288 Pac. 475 (1930).
"0Cord v. Cord, 217 Iowa 812, 253 N. W. 125 (i934); Woodall v. Woodall, 204 Iowa 423, 214 N. W.
0,
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their support when he shows they have become of age, or are self-supporting.72 It
has been held, however, that unless an amount is separately awarded to the children,
the decree awarding alimony should not be treated as conferring a separate award
and subsequent removal of the children from the mother's custody may be ground
for a diminution in the payments, but is not necessarily so. 73 Marriage of a daughter,
one of three children in the custody of the wife, has entitled the husband to a
74
reduction in the award from $77 a week to $250 a month.
The decision in the case of Fisher v. Fisher70 indicates a judicial reluctance to shift
the burden of supporting the wife from the divorced husband to the children when
the latter have grown up and are capable of earning income. Although it was shown
that the children were substantially contributing to the support of their mother, the
court refused to terminate the payments and held the circumstances alleged could
not relieve the husband of his responsibilities.
Immoral conduct on the part of the wife subsequent to the decree is sometimes
asserted by the husband as a basis for discontinuance of his alimony obligations. The
moral quality of the post-divorce behavior as a factor of pertinence in modification
cases stands in a category sui generis and bears no relation to the basic alimony
equation to which allusion has been made. Divorce decrees, particularly in England,
sometimes contain a provision for payment of alimony to the wife dum casta vixerit,
which frees the husband from the duty of contributing to the wife's support when
she has been guilty of unchastity and, in some instances, other moral derelictions.70
In the absence of such a provision, it is arguable that a wife who has been granted a
divorce a mensa et thoro is under a duty to her husband to abstain from the type of
conduct which would ordinarily enable him to secure a divorce of his own right.
Failure to observe this duty should properly justify termination of the alimony payments, and it was so held in Gloth v. Gloth.77 The argument is hardly applicable to
cases of absolute divorce, where the marriage relation has been completely severed
and the ordinary duties attendant upon that relation have ceased to exist, except insofar as the husband's obligation to furnish support is incorporated in the requirement
to pay alimony. In such a case it is held that the wife, after the divorce, owes to the
husband no greater duty to lead a pure and virtuous life than she owes to society
generally, and proof that she has had illicit relations with men should not avail the
husband in obtaining a modification of the decree. 78 But in Lindbloom v. Lindbloom the court said that the wife's misconduct is a factor properly to be considered
in reducing the alimony award.79 A recital in the decree that the wife recover per"Loomis v. Loomis, 273 Mich. 7, 262 N. W. 331 (1935); Smith v. Smith, 148 At. goo (R. I. 1930);
Brassert v. Brassert, supra note 6x.
"Rochelle v. Rochelle, 235 Ala. 526, 179 So. 825 (1938).
" Conklin v. Conklin, 299 N. Y. Supp. 306 (i937).
"237 Ky. 823, 36 S. NV. (2d) 635 (1931), reversing lower court's
'6 See 45 L. R. A. (m. s.) 880; (1913) Ann. Cas. 19X4D 597.

"Gloth v. Gloth,

decision.

154 Va. 511, 153 S. E. 879, 7 A. L. R. 700 (193o), affirming lower court's decision.
Cooley v. Cooley, 244 Ill. App. 488 (1928); Smith v. Johnson, 321 Ill. 134, 151 N. E. 55o (1926).
70 x8o Minn. 33, 230 N. W. 117 (1930), affirming lower court's decision.
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manent alimony "so long as she remains single and demeans herself in a proper
manner" has been held to be observed although she had consorted with men in noisy
parties and partaken of intoxicating liquors. The decree, said the court, did not
require her "to emulate St. Simeon Stylites if [she] wanted [her] alimony to
80
continue."
The courts apparently look with disfavor upon agreements between the parties
subsequent to the decree which purport to adjust the payments to changes in their
circumstances. Behind this attitude is the fear that justice would often be thwarted
by ignorance, undue influence, or deceit, and also stands the perennial judicial precaution against any individual action which will tend to oust the courts of their
inherent jurisdiction to determine controversies and adjudicate the rights of the
parties. In one case the court failed to uphold an agreement of the parties reducing
the amount of the alimony allowance from $125 to $45 a month upon marriage of a
daughter. 8 ' It was suggested such a contract was against public policy and that it
could neither supersede the original decree nor oust the court of its power to modify
it. In another, the husband asked the court to vacate the order for payment, on the
basis of a settlement entered into between the parties after the decree, and relief was
denied on the ground that the wife had not been afforded the protection of the court
in an inquiry as to the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement.8 2 In
the absence of a holding that the contract is opposed to public policy it is likely that
courts will promptly seize upon another factor which will justify cancellation of the
contract. Evidence, admittedly meager, that the wife was ill and in an overwrought
condition at the time the agreement was made modifying the terms of the alimony,
has been held sufficient to nullify the contract, and the wife was permitted to recover
8 3
the sum provided in the decree, less the amount received under the settlement.
An analysis of the cases reveals a dearth of substantive rules that bind the courts
in revising the alimony provisions of a divorce decree. It is evident that the question
is not susceptible of determination by the application of rigid formulae. Even where
the issues hinge on the increase or decrease of the income of the parties it is not possible to forecast the result by the use of simple rules of mathematics. In altering a
decree the courts exercise independent judgment on the proper relation that the factors of income and property should bear to the size of the award, and the cases
examined reveal that even where there has been a measurable change in the economic
status of the parties, the amendment of the decree is not directly proportional to it.
The courts have to deal with an almost innumerable variety of factors which may
bear on the propriety of the change or the continued enforcement of the decree. Conditions on the one side must be weighed against conditions on the other and a neat
balance struck which will represent an equitable compromise of conflicting interests.
In view of the latitude of circumstances that must be considered, which make it
0Blakely v. Blakely, 216 Ky. 318, 87 S. W. (2d) 628 (1935).
164 Va. 45, 178 S. E. 894 (935).
"Dreir v. Dreir, iox N. J. Eq. 342, 139 At. 235 (1927).
81 Capell v. Capell,

.'Hamlin v. Hamlin,
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possible to differentiate every case on its facts, no more than a general categorization
of the pertinent factors could be attempted. The necessity of flexibility in alimony
decrees is imperative and the exercise of a wise discretion on the part of the trial
judge, properly checked by recourse to appellate review, can probably do more to
insure substantial justice in this field than any code of rules designed to direct the
determination of these issues. However, it would not be prudent to overlook the
consequences of a policy which would favor revision of an order upon each fluctuating change in the condition of the parties, regardless of decree. Aside from its
encouragement of multiple and repeated invocations of judicial relief, it would introduce an element of uncertainty in the post-divorce relations of the parties which
might seriously hamper the effective enforcement of the courts' decrees. A certain
degree of permanence in the maintenance of the original award is therefore desirable.
Where the alimony has become "a club of revenge and hate in the hands of the one,
or a millstone about the neck of the other,"8 4 or where its enforcement would be
attended by "positive wrong and injustice,"85 the necessity of modification is
imminent.
Much agitation for the alteration of a decree could be avoided by the framing of
the original award with a view to reasonable and ordinary changes that may likely
occur in the relations of the parties. Where factors which are reasonably certain to
affect the circumstances of the parties can be anticipated, allowance therefor in the
decree would preerve its essential soundness in the face of these changes. For instance, where there are no children and the parties are young, the possibility, probability and desirability of allowing the husband to remarry could well be considered,
and future application by him for reduced payments might thereby be avoided.80 Or
where the divorced wife is pregnant, allowance for the child to be born will prevent
her from applying for additional payments for this support.8 7 The effect of the
increasing age of the parties on the fundamental factors of ability and needs is usually
considered in determining the original amount of alimony, and "age" is therefore
not regarded as a change in circumstances.8 8
The exercise of a "vise discretion" on the part of the trial judge is rendered difficult by the limitations on his ability to make a full and adequate investigation into
all the circumstances affecting the parties. Reliance on their testimony, which is often
conflicting, incomplete, and inaccurate, and the pressure of a crowded docket which
places a premium upon time may often lead to ill-advised decisions. The creation of
domestic relations courts and the extension of their powers to include matters of
divorce and alimony would induce a degree of specialization that would promote
efficiency and justice in the determination of such cases. Such a system, moreover,
would contemplate the preservation and exposition of the evidence relied upon in
84
8 5 Ruge

v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, x65 Pac. io63 (1917).
Metzger v. Metzger, 278 N. W. 187 (Iowa, 1938).
Lamborn v. Lamborn, supra note 45.
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making the alimony award and greatly facilitate the handling of future controversies
between the parties. Appointment of an official amicus curiae89 offers the advantages
of an impartial investigation into all relevant factors and a removal of most of the
difficulties encountered in securing adequate evidence. Exclusive reliance by the
court on the testimony of the investigator, however, is to be avoided as entailing the
perils inherent in any inquisitorial system where the parties are not given a full

opportunity to be heard. The most desirable method would probably lie in permitting their testimony to be supplemented and confirmed by the investigator. The
essential objective is the creation and maintenance of conditions which will permit
the courts to operate with full knowledge of the facts. Once these are available, determination of the issues should be left largely to discretion, tempered by experience
and a proper application of fundamental legal concepts.
8

For a description of the work of the Friend of the Court in Detroit with regard to alimony proceedings, see Pokorny, PracticalProblems in the Enforcement of Alimony Decrees, infra p. 274.

